

2025 Fortuna Advisors Buyback ROI Report

The \$4.1 Trillion Question: Do Buybacks Create Value?



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Fortuna Advisors collaborates with leaders to transform decision-making throughout their business to achieve exceptional results. Our management playbook delivers measurable outcomes through:

- Better Insights: See the truth about where value is created or destroyed.
- 2. **Better Decisions**: Drive faster, better and enduring results.
- 3. **Better Behaviors**: Align incentives and processes to drive execution.

We serve as a catalyst to create a culture of ownership, where everyone from the board to management and employees embraces a long-term investor perspective to unlock the organization's full value creation potential.

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Why Measure Buyback ROI?

These days, nearly everyone has an opinion on buybacks. From many investors' perspectives, these distributions drive up share prices, offer a tax-efficient vehicle to return capital to selling shareholders, and are instrumental in offsetting dilution from stock option awards. On the other side of the aisle, many claim share repurchases lead to long-term underinvestment, artificially inflate EPS to boost executive payouts, and put pressure on companies to underpay their workers.

While there are elements of truth to most, if not all, of these claims, we think the pundits and media are missing the more important question. Over the last five years, S&P 500 companies devoted \$4.1 trillion to share repurchases—just short of the \$4.2 trillion they spent on capital expenditures. So do these massive outlays of capital actually create value for managements and the shareholders they act on behalf of? The purpose of the report is to answer this question by calculating the returns associated with individual S&P 500 Buyback programs.

The condition for creating value from buybacks is relatively simple, as Warren Buffet explains in Berkshire Hathaway's 2022 Letter to Shareholders:

"The math isn't complicated: When the share count goes down, your interest in our many businesses goes up. Every small bit helps if repurchases are made at value-accretive prices. Just as surely, when a company overpays for repurchases, the continuing shareholders lose. At such times, gains flow only to the selling shareholders and to the friendly, but expensive, investment banker who recommended the foolish purchases."

Buffett and Berkshire Hathway's judicious approach to repurchases is fundamental to our mission to help companies achieve higher total shareholder return (TSR) by developing better ways to measure and motivate success and effective capital deployment. To this end, in 2011 we developed "Buyback ROI" to compare share repurchases to other capital uses, such as capital

expenditures and acquisitions.

It is a straightforward concept: when a company repurchases shares and its subsequent TSR is positive, it produces positive Buyback ROI. In other words, the company has earned a return on its investment in its own shares by retiring them before the market capitalization increase, which is concentrated in fewer shares.

When management achieves a Buyback ROI that exceeds the company's TSR, we refer to this as "Buyback Effectiveness." Achieving positive Buyback Effectiveness requires buying back more when your share price is below its longterm trendline, which results in repurchasing more shares per dollar of buybacks. In four out of our last five Buyback ROI reports, this timing factor has been negative, implying substantial opportunity costs and value left on the table for remaining shareholders in companies that repurchase stock.

Improving Buyback ROI and
Buyback Effectiveness should
be the goal of every share
repurchase program. Indeed,
management teams that
achieve strong results in these
metrics can be said to have
demonstrated good stewardship
of investor capital, and are not
just providing an artificial boost to
EPS performance by reducing the
share count.

For over a decade, Fortuna Advisors has advocated for a proactive, value-based approach to share buybacks. Since our introduction of Buyback ROI in a 2011 study, we have published our Buyback ROI ranking for the S&P 500's largest share repurchasers. The purpose of our Buyback ROI Reports has been threefold: (1) to show the staggering amounts of capital that have been deployed in repurchases; (2) to demonstrate how strategic repurchase programs can create value; and (3) to publish a comprehensive ranking of every substantial S&P 500 buyback program over the last five years.

Repurchases Surge to a New Record High

After a 13% decrease in 2023, S&P 500 buyback volume swelled 16% to \$935 billion in 2024, breaking the previous record from 2022. S&P 500¹ companies repurchased stock steadily throughout 2024, with volume peaking at \$243 billion in Q4, which coincided with an all-time high for the index itself. Quarterly buyback volume has exceeded this level only twice, in Q4 of 2021 and Q1 of 2022, periods

which also coincided with the previous high for the S&P 500 index following the 2021 bull run.

In Figure 1, we track buyback volume vs the S&P 500 index, which shows that companies tend to repurchase more stock when share prices are relatively higher. This makes sense to a degree, since high markets typically means strong economic

activity and higher cash levels, which fuel repurchases and other shareholder distributions. But it also means companies are buying at share prices that are relatively high, presenting steep opportunity costs for the capital deployed to buybacks.






Figure 2 shows the distribution of S&P 500 capital allocation across the last five years. Since 2020, buyback spending was second only to capex, and only marginally

so. During this period, S&P 500 companies spent \$4.2 trillion on capex (28% of total capital deployed) versus \$4.1 trillion in stock repurchases (27% of total

capital deployed), which highlights the staggering amount of capital distributed back to investors through buybacks in modern capital markets.





Trends in Capital Deployment


While buybacks showed the biggest percentage increase in 2024, capital expenditure (capex) also rose substantially, by 12%, breaching \$1 trillion for the first time. Indeed, capex grew 61% cumulatively over the last five years. This increasing capital spend was fueled by many factors, including the nearshoring of supply chains after the COVID pandemic and the more recent boom in Al-related data centers and infrastructure in recent years. Other contributing factors included higher domestic energy production as well as the rapid scaling of manufacturing facilities to produce weight loss drugs.

At the same time, companies scaled back on cash M&A, devoting 19% less cash to acquisitions in 2024, for a total of \$328 billion, despite reported higher deal volume and value compared to 2023. Managements may have been more inclined to use their stock to complete deals, given rising share prices and valuations in 2024. Much of the uptick in deal volume can also be attributed to private equity and private companies, which would not have been captured in our sample of S&P 500 companies.

R&D spending grew 11% in 2024, which marks a deceleration from the previous two years and falls just below the average for the last five years. While it's difficult to draw any clear conclusions from this mild deceleration, it could signal that Al enthusiasm has leveled off heading into 2025.

Dividends also continued their slow but steady growth trajectory, growing 6% in 2024. While buybacks tend to fluctuate with the market, as shown in *Figure 1*, Dividends tend to be much more stable and predictable, as shown by their stairstep pattern in *Figure 3*.





Fortuna Buyback Metrics Explained

Fortuna Advisors developed Buyback ROI and Buyback Effectiveness to enable comparison of a company's share repurchase activity to its other uses of capital. In general terms, when the value of an acquired asset increases, we say it has earned a positive return on investment. Our thinking behind buybacks is similar—when the implied value of a company's repurchased shares increases over a period, it has earned a positive Buyback ROI.

Buyback ROI is calculated as an annualized internal rate of return (IRR) that accounts for: (1) the cash outflows associated with share repurchases; (2) the estimated cash "inflows" of dividends "avoided"; and (3) an estimated final "inflow" related to the final value of the accumulated shares repurchased.

If a company's share price starts the year at \$100, pays a dividend of \$1 at the end of each quarter and has a yearend share price of \$110, it would have an initial outflow of \$101 (factoring a 1% excise tax), \$4 of quarterly "inflows," and a final "inflow" of \$110 at the end of the year—resulting in a Buyback ROI of 13.1%, as shown in Figure 4.

While it is easier to achieve a positive Buyback ROI when a company's TSR is generally increasing, it can also be achieved through effective timing of repurchases.

Buyback Effectiveness


measures the value attributable to optimizing the timing of repurchases. It is calculated as the compound difference

| | Time 0 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
|--------------|-----------|--------|--------|--------|----------|
| Buyback | \$100.00 | | | | |
| Tax | \$1.00 | | | | |
| Dividends | | \$1.00 | \$1.00 | \$1.00 | \$1.00 |
| Ending Price | | | | | \$110.00 |
| Cash Flows | -\$101.00 | \$1.00 | \$1.00 | \$1.00 | \$111.00 |

between Buyback ROI and the company's TSR, as shown in Figure 5. When Buyback ROI exceeds TSR, a company has executed buybacks when its stock was priced below the long-term trend, on average. When Buyback ROI trails TSR, a company has executed buybacks above this long-term price trend.

If the company had 16% TSR while generating the 13.1% Buyback ROI described above, it would mean it had negative Buyback Effectiveness due to poor timing. Alternatively, if it had 12% TSR with 13.1% Buyback ROI, it would have benefitted from good timing on its buybacks and positive Buyback Effectiveness.

To improve Buyback
Effectiveness, companies should
have a real-time perspective on
their intrinsic value per share and
how that compares to market
price per share—they are rarely
the same. With the right toolkit
and metrics, company Treasurers
can build confidence on the best
times to execute buybacks.



Buyback ROI and Buyback Effectiveness Rebounded in 2024

After two consecutive dismal years for Buyback ROI, 2024's sharply rising market offered some respite for the measure, which increased to 11.3%. *Figure 6* shows the trailing five-year median Buyback ROI for S&P 500 companies in our study over the last ten years. While 27% of our S&P 500 sample¹ achieved a negative Buyback ROI in the 2023 report, in the 2024 report this figure shrunk to 22%.


While the discussion so far has focused on TSR, the other determinant of Buyback ROI is the timing of share repurchases, which we capture in Buyback Effectiveness. Historically, most companies tend to overlook the importance of timing and relative valuation when planning repurchases. As mentioned earlier, many make the decision to buy back shares based on excess cash rather than determining whether executing at the current share price is likely to be value-accretive or dilutive for shareholders. As a result, in all but one of the last five median reports, Buyback Effectiveness has been negative.

In last year's report, there was a precipitous drop to -3.6%, well below the historical average, with 76% of our sample of S&P 500 companies yielding negative Buyback Effectiveness. Over the latest five-year period ending in 2024, this timing factor improved to -0.4% for the median company, with 60% having negative Buyback Effectiveness. While this shows improvement, it's still concerning

FIGURE 6 | Median Buyback ROI Performance* **Buyback ROI Rebounded in 2024** 20.0% 18.0% 16.0% 15.5% Median Buyback ROI 13.8% 14.0% 13.2% 12.0% 12.0% 11.3% 11.2% 11.1% 10.0% 8.1% 8.0% 6.4% 6.5% 6.0% 4.0% 2.0% 0.0% 2016 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2015 2017 2018 2019



*Calculated as trailing five-year performance.



that a majority of S&P repurchasers have a negative timing impact.

While there are many methodologies that can be applied to strategic timing of repurchases, consider the following to illustrate the immense value at stake. In a scenario where buybacks for S&P 500 companies were redistributed so that the

same amount was repurchased each quarter, 73% would have retired more shares. The average company would have been able to repurchase an additional 4.0% more shares, worth an additional \$369 million at the end of the fiveyear period. On aggregate, these shares would have been worth an additional \$180 billion as of the end of 2024.

Top Ten: Buyback ROI and Buyback Effectiveness

Despite the mixed results for S&P 500 repurchasers as a group, there were many companies that created value for their shareholders through their buyback programs. *Figure 8* lists the top ten companies in Buyback ROI over the last five years.

FIGURE 8 | Buyback ROI: 2020 – 2024 Top 10 Buyback ROI Companies

| Rank | Company | Buybacks (\$ millions) | Buyback ROI | TSR* | Buyback Effectiveness |
|------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|-------|--------------------------|
| 1 | Vistra Corp. | 4,931 | 115.0% | 43.8% | 49.5% |
| 2 | NVIDIA Corporation | 67,312 | 114.2% | 92.8% | 11.1% |
| 3 | Targa Resources Corp. | 1,652 | 70.5% | 39.3% | 22.3% |
| 4 | General Electric Company | 8,215 | 65.0% | 28.7% | 28.2% |
| 5 | Broadcom Inc. | 32,463 | 64.3% | 47.8% | 11.2% |
| 6 | Fair Isaac Corporation | 4,115 | 63.7% | 44.7% | 13.1% |
| 7 | Arista Networks, Inc. | 2,163 | 59.3% | 50.9% | 5.6% |
| 8 | Howmet Aerospace Inc. | 1,801 | 55.3% | 37.8% | 12.8% |
| 9 | Netflix, Inc. | 13,142 | 52.1% | 22.7% | 24.0% |
| 10 | Deckers Outdoor Corporation | 1,536 | 51.4% | 46.8% | 3.1% |
| Med | ian of Top 10 | 4,523 | 64.0% | 44.3% | 13.0% |
| Medi | ian of All Ranked Companies | 4,388 | 11.3% | 10.5% | -1.0% |

*Note: TSR measured as the starting and ending average quarterly share price.

Vistra Corp., a Texas-based utilities company, was the top performer in this year's report in both Buyback ROI and Buyback Effectiveness. As a retail electricity and power generation company, Vistra benefited tremendously from the growing energy demand created by AI data centers and infrastructure in 2023 and 2024. Vistra's strong buyback performance over the last five years was fueled by concentrated share repurchases in 2022, including \$710 million in Q1 2022, which appreciated handsomely

as their share price took off in 2023 and 2024. Vistra's performance was notably driven by its strong Buyback Effectiveness, which propelled its Buyback ROI to 115.0%, a return more than double its annualized TSR of 43.8%!

NVIDIA was a close second with a Buyback ROI of 114.2%. Unlike Vistra, NVIDIA's performance was largely fueled by an impressive annualized TSR² of 92.8% from 2020 – 2024, with a relatively marginal contribution Buyback Effectiveness. While these top two performers exemplify

different ways to achieve strong Buyback ROI, it's notable that all of the top ten exhibit positive Buyback Effectiveness, emphasizing the importance of good timing to get the most out of your buyback program.

Notably, our top ten list comprises a wide range of sectors, but there is a tilt towards Information Technology (NVIDIA, Broadcom, Fair Isaac, and Arista Networks) given the sector's strong TSR over the last five years.

FIGURE 9 | Buyback Effectiveness: 2020 – 2024 **Top 10 Buyback Effectiveness Companies**

| Rank | Company | Buybacks (\$ millions) | Buyback ROI | TSR* | Buyback Effectiveness |
|------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|-------|--------------------------|
| 1 | Vistra Corp. | 4,931 | 115.0% | 43.8% | 49.5% |
| 2 | Incyte Corporation | 2,153 | 34.7% | -3.6% | 39.6% |
| 3 | General Motors Company | 20,679 | 44.4% | 8.5% | 33.1% |
| 4 | General Electric Company | 8,215 | 65.0% | 28.7% | 28.2% |
| 5 | Netflix, Inc. | 13,142 | 52.1% | 22.7% | 24.0% |
| 6 | Targa Resources Corp. | 1,652 | 70.5% | 39.3% | 22.3% |
| 7 | Salesforce, Inc. | 19,449 | 38.9% | 15.4% | 20.4% |
| 8 | Las Vegas Sands Corp. | 2,263 | 16.7% | -2.6% | 19.8% |
| 9 | NRG Energy, Inc. | 3,040 | 46.9% | 22.6% | 19.8% |
| 10 | Booking Holdings Inc. | 24,973 | 40.5% | 19.8% | 17.3% |
| Medi | an of Top 10 | 6,573 | 45.6% | 21.2% | 23.2% |
| Medi | an of All Ranked Companies | 4,388 | 11.3% | 10.5% | -1.0% |

*Note: TSR measured as the starting and ending average quarterly share price.

Similar to Vistra, Incyte
Corporation demonstrates
how Buyback Effectiveness can
provide strong ROI—even for
companies with negative TSR.
Despite a -3.6% annualized TSR
over the period, Incyte leveraged

good timing to produce positive Buyback ROI of 34.7%, which puts it in the 85th percentile and 31st overall in our S&P 500 ranking.

Other standouts include General Motors, Booking Holdings, and

Salesforce, which seemed to pay particular attention to the timing of their repurchases.

Case Study: Salesforce's Strong Buyback Timing




Figure 10 shows Salesforce's quarterly buybacks overlaid on their average share price and constant share price appreciation trendlines. Note the large volume of shares repurchased in Q4 of 2022 Q2 of 2024, which accounted for more than a third of their total buybacks over the last five years. In these periods

the company's average share price was below the share price appreciation trendline, and even further below their 2024 ending share price, creating an attractive opportunity to buy back shares.

This repurchasing pattern helped Salesforce place

seventh in Buyback
Effectiveness at 20.4%,
leveraging their Buyback ROI
up to 38.9%, despite TSR of only
15.4%. Salesforce management
skillfully capitalized on volatility
in their share price by buying
back shares at relative
lows, ultimately delivering
substantial value added for its
shareholders.

Buyback ROI by Sector

Industrials and Financials were the top-performing sectors with 15.3% and 14.4% Buyback ROI, respectively. Notably, these two sectors also benefited from positive Buyback Effectiveness. As cyclical industries, they were particularly exposed to share price volatility, which enabled them to increase their Buyback Effectiveness and thus ROI.

Industrials was also buoyed by strong TSR, particularly in recent years, as a boom in Capital Goods was ignited by high business and consumer confidence. In the wake of the COVID recovery, US companies aggressively built homes, factories, and data centers, among other capital-intensive investments. Just as notable was the strong performance of Aerospace and Defense companies following heightened geopolitical tension and renewed space exploration ambitions.

Financials was second in both Buyback ROI and Buyback Effectiveness, suggesting the sector as a whole may have been paying more attention than others to the implications of buyback timing. Perhaps they too read Buffett and Munger's 2023 comments on buybacks and took their philosophy to heart. Financials also notably had the second-most buyback volume

by sector with \$787 billion in repurchases.

Information Technology stood out in two ways. It had the highest total buybacks—as the only sector to exceed \$1 trillion in repurchase volume—and had the highest annualized TSR at 16.8%. Unfortunately, with so many of its buybacks concentrated around share price highs in 2021, the sector suffers from poor Buyback Effectiveness of -2.8%. The combination of high buybacks and poor timing makes the tech industry a prime target for activists and other investors who would benefit from a more judicious approach to share repurchases.

Utilities was also a standout by virtue of its low TSR combined with the highest Buyback Effectiveness of any sector, which propelled it to fifth place on overall Buyback ROI. Part of this result stems from Utilities' TSR underperformance in 2020 – 2023 versus the rest of the market, and stark outperformance in 2024. But it also results from the sectors' opportunist concentration of repurchases in downturns, when others became more conservative with repurchases. In fact, Utilities highest buyback volume over the last five years came in Q3 of 2020, which was the second lowest quarter by

volume for every other sector combined. As with Vistra Corp., the sector as a whole demonstrates how good timing can offset lackluster TSR.

The Energy sector experienced substantial whiplash, dropping all the way from the top sector spot in last year's report and the only sector to have positive Buyback Effectiveness, to the 8th spot with the second-worst Buyback Effectiveness. This precipitous decline was fueled largely by falling oil prices, which approached a four-year low at the end of 2024.

Real Estate bears two unfortunate distinctions in this report. It was the only sector with median negative Buyback ROI, and it had the worst Buyback Effectiveness at -6.2%. As a historically stable sector, Real Estate tends to struggle with Buyback Effectiveness. But the fact that it had the lowest TSR of the group also didn't do the sector any favors.

FIGURE 11 | Buyback ROI by Sector: 2020 - 2024

Industrials and Financials on Top

| | | Aggregate | | Median | |
|------|------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|--------|--------------------------|
| Rank | Sector | Buybacks (\$ millions) | Buyback ROI | TSR | Buyback Effectiveness |
| 1 | Industrials | 315,699 | 15.3% | 13.8% | 0.8% |
| 2 | Financials | 786,684 | 14.4% | 13.3% | 2.0% |
| 3 | Information Technology | 1,098,832 | 14.1% | 16.8% | -2.8% |
| 4 | Consumer Discretionary | 337,597 | 13.9% | 11.2% | -1.3% |
| 5 | Utilities | 13,516 | 12.3% | 7.1% | 4.9% |
| 6 | Materials | 90,036 | 8.1% | 10.0% | -5.1% |
| 7 | Communication Services | 595,586 | 7.7% | 8.7% | 0.7% |
| 8 | Energy | 203,725 | 7.2% | 14.2% | -5.6% |
| 9 | Health Care | 374,218 | 3.1% | 9.4% | -4.7% |
| 10 | Consumer Staples | 189,390 | 0.9% | 6.3% | -3.9% |
| 11 | Real Estate | 7,191 | -1.2% | 5.4% | -6.2% |
| | | | | | |

^{*}Note: TSR measured as the starting and ending average quarterly share price.
**Note: Medians affect the relationship of Buyback ROI, TSR, and Buyback Effectiveness.

To put some familiar names to this sector ranking, we also include *Figure 12*, which lists the top three Buyback ROI companies in each sector, along with their Buyback ROI results.

FIGURE 12 | Buyback ROI 2020 - 2024

Top Buyback ROI Companies by Sector

#1 in Sector

| Sector | Company | Buyback ROI |
|------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------|
| Industrials | General Electric Company | 65.0% |
| Financials | Apollo Global Management, Inc. | 49.0% |
| Information Technology | NVIDIA Corporation | 114.2% |
| Consumer Discretionary | Deckers Outdoor Corporation | 51.4% |
| Utilities | Vistra Corp. | 115.0% |
| Materials | Packaging Corporation of America | 31.9% |
| Communication Services | Netflix, Inc. | 52.1% |
| Energy | Targa Resources Corp. | 70.5% |
| Health Care | Eli Lilly and Company | 51.3% |
| Consumer Staples | Costco Wholesale Corporation | 31.5% |
| Real Estate | CBRE Group, Inc. | 22.2% |
| | | |

#2 in Sector

| Sector | Company | Buyback ROI |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------|
| Industrials | Howmet Aerospace Inc. | 55.3% |
| Financials | KKR & Co. Inc. | 42.9% |
| Information Technology | Broadcom Inc. | 64.3% |
| Consumer Discretionary | General Motors Company | 44.4% |
| Utilities | NRG Energy, Inc. | 46.9% |
| Materials | Steel Dynamics, Inc. | 26.9% |
| Communication Services | Meta Platforms, Inc. | 37.5% |
| Energy | Marathon Petroleum Corporation | 24.8% |
| Health Care | Intuitive Surgical, Inc. | 37.0% |
| Consumer Staples | Walmart Inc. | 25.6% |
| Real Estate | Weyerhaeuser Company | -1.2% |

#3 in Sector

| Sector | Company | Buyback ROI |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------|
| Industrials | United Rentals, Inc. | 48.7% |
| Financials | Arch Capital Group Ltd. | 33.0% |
| Information Technology | Fair Isaac Corporation | 63.7% |
| Consumer Discretionary | PulteGroup, Inc. | 40.9% |
| Utilities | Sempra | 12.3% |
| Materials | Linde plc | 17.7% |
| Communication Services | T-Mobile US, Inc. | 23.8% |
| Energy | Diamondback Energy, Inc. | 23.5% |
| Health Care | Incyte Corporation | 34.7% |
| Consumer Staples | Altria Group, Inc. | 17.6% |
| Real Estate | SBA Communications Corporation | -6.5% |

The Important Role of Buybacks

Companies generally repurchase shares for three reasons. The first is to efficiently return capital to shareholders willing to sell their ownership in a company in part, or in whole, and redeploy the capital elsewhere. Such repurchases have the effect of reducing the number of shares outstanding, which concentrates future value creation (or destruction) for remaining shareholders.

Alternatively, companies also repurchase shares in the public market to offset newly issued shares awarded to employees as equity-based compensation. This form of repurchase is intended to reduce the net new shares issued and avoid dilution to existing shareholders that wish to retain their existing level of ownership in a company. In both cases, such repurchases are recorded in companies' cash flow statements as a purchase of common stock under financing activities.

A third form of repurchase occurs when an employee's equitybased compensation vests and is therefore treated as taxable income. To meet the company's obligation to withhold tax on taxable income, companies may net-share settle the equity-based compensation awarded to the employee. In effect, they are "repurchasing" shares that had been awarded to the employee, which results in reducing the company's diluted number of shares outstanding. This payment of the tax obligations related to

equity-based compensation is also recorded as a financing activity on the cashflow statement. For the purposes of our study, we do not distinguish between these three forms of repurchase activity.

Regardless of form, we continue to believe repurchases have a rightful place in the capital markets.

The role of these markets is to move capital from where there is excess supply to where there is an unmet need for it. Investors and companies are thought of as the two sides of that market, but the investors themselves must first gather the capital that they will then allocate to companies.

This capital can come from places like insurance companies, pension funds, endowments, or family offices that have capital today, but no use for it until some future event. Capital can also come from investors' prior investments. When an investment has succeeded and produced a return in excess of what can be profitably redeployed within a company, buybacks serve as an efficient method to distribute such excess return through the capital markets to other companies with better growth prospects. Further, we believe restrictions on buybacks would, at best, result in higher dividends and, at worst, slow innovation and breed corporate complacency, as companies have less pressure to be efficient with their capital.

The importance of developing a thoughtful buyback policy took the


forefront in 2020. Many companies that bought back billions in stock from 2016 to 2019 had to raise capital to maintain solvency. Opponents of buybacks pointed out that, had these companies been more temperate with buybacks in prior years, not only could they have had the financial flexibility to weather the pandemic better in 2020, they would have also been poised to pursue more opportunistic investment. While some headlines in 2020 may have cast a shadow over the practice, we believe this should not diminish the important role buybacks play in recycling, and better allocating, capital across markets.

Companies have three primary options when considering how to deploy capital: value creation, financial flexibility, or value distribution. Companies should first consider value-creating growth opportunities that exceed their cost of capital. These can include organic growth, acquisition, or collaborative growth. If no attractive opportunities for growth exist, companies should consider the optimal level of financial flexibility—let 2020 be a reminder of that. Once value creation and financial flexibility are fully evaluated and funded, the last option should be distribution of capital back to shareholders either through dividends or buybacks.

With that said, when a company decides to distribute capital to investors through buybacks, they should do so systematically, applying the same discipline as with any other investment to ensure they are optimizing the "return" they earn. The best way to do this is to compare a company's intrinsic value per share to the market value per share and repurchase shares when management believes,

based on objective analysis, that their shares are undervalued. Such valuation signals can be used to indicate when shares are likely undervalued—a good time to execute a repurchase; or when shares are likely overvalued—an excellent time to use those shares as acquisition currency. With

these signals in mind, Fortuna has developed a value-inspired buyback execution methodology, or "VIBE," which helps companies understand their buyback prospects at any point in time.



The Debate Over Buybacks

The debate about whether or a not a company should use its capital to buy back stock can be intense. Broad statements in favor or against buybacks lack nuance and the simple recognition that both sides have a similar goal in mind-that the earnings and cashflow of a business be put to good use. The difference comes in how the two sides believe that goal is most likely to be achieved.

Many in the anti-buyback camp believe the optimal allocation of capital, for the good of the company and all its stakeholders, is achieved by companies committing to strengthening their own balance sheets, increasing their employees' wages, and continually striving for growth. These are all choices a company has for allocating its capital internally, so an anti-buyback philosophy is implicitly an argument that company managers are good allocators of capitalthat their reinvestments within the company will lead to incremental value creation for the firm's employees, stakeholders, and shareholders.

If investors were confident companies could do this effectively, the debate would favor leaving capital at the original company to compound in value through effective reinvestment. For example, a long-term Amazon investor has done much better from the company reinvesting in its business than if Amazon had repurchased that stock along the way, forcing the investor to find a new use for the capital.

But buyback proponents believe examples like Amazon are rare, and that professional investors tend to be better capital allocators than company managers thanks to their dedicated skill sets and to the sharper edge of their results-oriented environment. Professional investors can also more efficiently re-allocate capital within a sector, or from one sector to another, to support overall economic growth through secular shifts in the way value is created.

The question, then, is not really whether buybacks are "good" or "bad," but whether corporate managers are good or bad at allocating the



The real question is not whether buybacks are "good" or "bad," but whether corporate managers are good or bad at allocating capital.

capital entrusted to them by their investors, and whether and when they should return that capital. The answer to this question varies by industry and by management team. Indeed, a large part of Fortuna's practice is helping our corporate clients become better investors of their own capital.

For those with a strong view either way on this debate, we would like to understand your perspectives. Please feel free to email us at info@fortuna-advisors.com to share your views or suggest a call for a discussion.

Concluding Remarks

Thank you for your time and interest in our analysis and commentary. With the ever-increasing allocation of cash to buybacks, it's also becoming increasingly important for corporate leaders to understand how their buyback program can contribute or detract from a company's success.

This report aims to help companies evaluate and make the most of their own buyback prospects and performance. We hope that, as attitudes about buybacks evolve, companies will continue to embrace careful and comprehensive planning for buybacks, as they would with any substantial capital outlay.

Better-informed buyback programs can lead the way to more value creation for all stakeholders, and to a better overall allocation of resources across the economy.

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




Managements know the key to creating value from buybacks is to concentrate repurchases when share prices are low. Unfortunately for all stakeholders, more than half of S&P 500 repurchasers bought back more shares when their prices were above the trend, from 2002-2024.

VIBE is a fact-based platform that provides managements with real-time signals to help override natural biases, limited information, and human error to better inform the timing of share repurchases.

Buyback programs can and should be sources of immense value for many companies. VIBE can help them harness it.



Actual market price

RCE-Implied value

VIBE signals:

PERFORMANCE & VALUATION

Based on the company and its peers, indicates the likelihood of a desirable Buyback ROI.

2 consensus vs. price

Based on the dividend yield and an expected share price CAGR, derived from consensus EPS growth.

RCE-IMPLIED PREMIUM

Based on Fortuna Advisors'
Residual Cash Earnings (RCE)
measure of intrinsic share value.

4 VIBE SIMULATIONS

Based on 1000+ simulations that incorporate growth, margins, and asset intensity.

If you would like to learn more about how Fortuna Advisors can help improve your buyback program, or would like a summary of your company's Buyback ROI performance, please feel free reach out to us.

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2025 Fortuna Advisors Buyback ROI Ranking

| Rank | Company Name | Total Buybacks (\$ millions) | Buyback ROI | Buyback Effectiveness | Rank | Company Name | Total Buybacks (\$ millions) | Buyback ROI | Buyback Effectiveness |
|----------|---|------------------------------------|----------------|--------------------------|------------|---|------------------------------------|----------------|--------------------------|
| 1 | Vistra Corp. | 4,931 | 115.0% | 49.5% | 77 | Diamondback Energy, Inc. | 3,807 | 23.5% | 1.7% |
| 2 | NVIDIA Corporation | 67,312 | 114.2% | 11.1% | 78 | Leidos Holdings, Inc. | 2,069 | 23.2% | 6.9% |
| 3 | Targa Resources Corp. | 1,652 | 70.5% | 22.3% | 79 | Vertex Pharmaceuticals Incorporated | | 22.7% | 3.9% |
| 4 | General Electric Company | 8,215 | 65.0% | 28.2% | 80 | AutoZone, Inc. | 15,600 | 22.3% | 0.0% |
| 5 | Broadcom Inc. | 32,463 | 64.3% | 11.2% | 81 | Cencora, Inc. | 4,179 | 22.3% | -1.4% |
| 6 | Fair Isaac Corporation | 4,115 | 63.7% | 13.1% | 82 | CBRE Group, Inc. | 3,858 | 22.2% | 2.9% |
| 7 | Arista Networks Inc | 2,163 | 59.3% | 5.6% | 83 | Carrier Global Corporation | 3,482 | 22.2% | NA |
| 8 | Howmet Aerospace Inc. | 1,801 | 55.3% | 12.8% | 84 | Synchrony Financial | 9,301 | 22.1% | 6.8% |
| 9 | Netflix, Inc. | 13,142 | 52.1% 51.4% | 24.0% | 85 | W. R. Berkley Corporation | 1,404 | 22.0% 22.0% | 4.8% -6.5% |
| 10 11 | Deckers Outdoor Corporation | 1,536 6,500 | 51.4% | 3.1% 0.7% | 86 87 | Apple Inc. Synopsys, Inc. | 451,957 4,261 | 22.0% | -6.7% |
| 12 | Eli Lilly and Company Dell Technologies Inc. | 9,801 | 49.3% | 7.5% | 88 | The Bank of New York Mellon Corporat | | 21.4% | 6.9% |
| 13 | Apollo Global Management, Inc. | 2,477 | 49.0% | 11.1% | 89 | Cboe Global Markets, Inc. | 895 | 21.2% | 6.7% |
| 14 | United Rentals, Inc. | 4,029 | 48.7% | 4.9% | 90 | Republic Services, Inc. | 1,299 | 21.2% | 0.4% |
| 15 | NRG Energy, Inc. | 3,040 | 46.9% | 19.8% | 91 | Snap-on Incorporated | 1,388 | 20.5% | 1.5% |
| 16 | Builders FirstSource, Inc. | 7,774 | 46.6% | -1.8% | 92 | Baker Hughes Company | 2,284 | 20.4% | 4.2% |
| 17 | General Motors Company | 20,679 | 44.4% | 33.1% | 93 | JPMorgan Chase & Co. | 56,741 | 20.0% | 3.5% |
| 18 | KKR & Co. Inc. | 1,152 | 42.9% | 1.8% | 94 | Discover Financial Services | 6,988 | 20.0% | 2.1% |
| 19 | PulteGroup, Inc. | 4,413 | 40.9% | 9.5% | 95 | Wells Fargo & Company | 56,047 | 19.7% | 10.5% |
| 20 | Booking Holdings Inc. | 24,973 | 40.5% | 17.3% | 96 | Alphabet Inc. | 264,445 | 19.5% | -2.2% |
| 21 | Palo Alto Networks, Inc. | 4,224 | 40.5% | 1.9% | 97 | Microsoft Corporation | 121,523 | 19.5% | -4.3% |
| 22 | Trane Technologies plc | 4,501 | 39.2% | 3.7% | 98 | Tractor Supply Company | 3,096 | 19.5% | -5.4% |
| 23 | Salesforce, Inc. | 19,449 | 38.9% | 20.4% | 99 | The Travelers Companies, Inc. | 7,072 | 19.4% | 3.4% |
| 24 | GoDaddy Inc. | 4,309 | 37.6% | 12.3% | 100 | Dover Corporation | 1,323 | 19.4% | 4.3% |
| 25 | Meta Platforms, Inc. | 162,120 | 37.5% | 10.1% | 101 | Berkshire Hathaway Inc. | 71,710 | 19.4% | 2.7% |
| 26 | Intuitive Surgical, Inc. | 4,174 | 37.0% | 11.7% | 102 | Morgan Stanley | 35,213 | 19.2% | -4.6% |
| 27 | TransDigm Group Incorporated | 1,247 | 37.0% | 11.1% | 103 | The Allstate Corporation | 6,798 | 19.1% | 3.6% |
| 28 | Eaton Corporation plc | 4,771 | 36.0% 35.0% | 1.1% 3.5% | 104 | Verisk Analytics, Inc. | 5,841 | 19.1% 19.1% | 4.3% -0.3% |
| 29 30 | W.W. Grainger, Inc. | 4,108 1,580 | 35.0% | 4.0% | 105 106 | BlackRock, Inc. | 9,440 4,481 | 18.7% | -0.2% |
| 31 | Parker-Hannifin Corporation Incyte Corporation | 2,153 | 34.7% | 39.6% | 100 | Tapestry, Inc. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. | 3,599 | 18.7% | -7.0% |
| 32 | Williams-Sonoma, Inc. | 3,414 | 34.6% | -2.8% | 107 | Chubb Limited | 12,571 | 18.4% | 2.8% |
| 33 | Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies | , | 33.7% | 9.6% | 109 | HCA Healthcare, Inc. | 25,509 | 18.2% | -3.1% |
| 00 | Corporation | 2,00 | 00.770 | | 110 | AbbVie Inc. | 7,079 | 18.1% | -3.5% |
| 34 | Arch Capital Group Ltd. | 1,933 | 33.0% | 10.8% | 111 | Linde plc | 20,677 | 17.7% | -1.5% |
| 35 | Ameriprise Financial, Inc. | 10,024 | 32.9% | 1.9% | 112 | Altria Group, Inc. | 7,900 | 17.6% | 5.8% |
| 36 | Cintas Corporation | 4,036 | 32.6% | 4.0% | 113 | Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company | 1,499 | 17.6% | 7.6% |
| 37 | Packaging Corporation of America | 837 | 31.9% | 10.2% | 114 | Cummins Inc. | 2,444 | 17.5% | -0.3% |
| 38 | Motorola Solutions, Inc. | 3,028 | 31.8% | 5.2% | 115 | Johnson Controls International plc | 6,677 | 16.9% | 0.5% |
| 39 | Costco Wholesale Corporation | 4,370 | 31.5% | 3.0% | 116 | Micron Technology, Inc. | 4,702 | 16.7% | 0.0% |
| 40 | Oracle Corporation | 55,234 | 31.3% | 2.2% | 117 | Las Vegas Sands Corp. | 2,263 | 16.7% | 19.8% |
| 41 | Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. | 7,419 | 31.1% | 9.4% | 118 | Amazon.com, Inc. | 6,000 | 16.7% | -1.3% |
| 42 | Caterpillar Inc. | 20,767 | 31.0% | 4.5% | 119 | Automatic Data Processing, Inc. | 6,731 | 16.6% | 1.6% |
| 43 | Cardinal Health, Inc. | 4,388 | 30.8% | 7.8% | 120 | Citizens Financial Group, Inc. | 2,713 | 16.5% | 7.6% |
| 44 | Ralph Lauren Corporation | 2,026 | 30.8% | 11.3% | 121 | Universal Health Services, Inc. | 3,479 | 16.5% | 8.0% |
| 45 | McKesson Corporation | 13,770 | 30.8% 30.4% | -1.4% -2.6% | 122 | MetLife, Inc. | 15,090 | 16.5% 16.4% | 0.9% |
| 46 | KLA Corporation | 9,952 4,675 | 30.4% | 1.1% | 123 | Moody's Corporation | 4,454 5,569 | 16.3% | -0.9% 2.4% |
| 47 48 | Jabil Inc. | 11,847 | 29.5% | 9.4% | 124 125 | Emerson Electric Co. General Dynamics Corporation | 4,779 | 16.3% | 3.3% |
| 49 | Aflac Incorporated Marriott International, Inc. | 10,959 | 29.4% | 11.4% | 125 | Waste Management, Inc. | 5,000 | 16.3% | 0.6% |
| 50 | Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. | 3,316 | 29.4% | -0.7% | 127 | Applied Materials, Inc. | 18,707 | 16.1% | -9.0% |
| 51 | ServiceNow, Inc. | 3,941 | 29.2% | -1.3% | 128 | Loews Corporation | 4,245 | 16.1% | 4.7% |
| 52 | Blackstone Inc. | 3,323 | 28.3% | -2.8% | 129 | Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. | 5,918 | 16.0% | -1.7% |
| 53 | Amphenol Corporation | 3,141 | 28.2% | 3.8% | 130 | Mastercard Incorporated | 39,888 | 15.9% | 2.1% |
| 54 | Gartner, Inc. | 4,217 | 28.0% | 0.3% | 131 | Corning Incorporated | 1,071 | 15.8% | 1.9% |
| 55 | Fortinet, Inc. | 5,964 | 27.8% | -6.4% | 132 | Lockheed Martin Corporation | 22,702 | 15.3% | 4.6% |
| 56 | D.R. Horton, Inc. | 6,539 | 27.7% | 0.6% | 133 | State Street Corporation | 8,433 | 15.0% | 4.9% |
| 57 | Lennox International Inc. | 1,138 | 27.5% | 4.7% | 134 | Intuit Inc. | 11,345 | 15.0% | -4.4% |
| 58 | Raymond James Financial, Inc. | 2,650 | 27.3% | 3.4% | 135 | Seagate Technology Holdings plc | 4,706 | 14.9% | -1.3% |
| 59 | Fiserv, Inc. | 17,953 | 27.0% | 12.3% | 136 | Masco Corporation | 3,767 | 14.9% | 1.0% |
| 60 | Steel Dynamics, Inc. | 5,632 | 26.9% | -6.6% | 137 | The Kroger Co. | 9,182 | 14.9% | -4.1% |
| 61 | NetApp, Inc. | 4,033 | 26.6% | 6.1% | 138 | DaVita Inc. | 5,768 | 14.9% | -3.3% |
| 62 | RTX Corporation | 18,495 | 26.4% | 15.0% | 139 | The Sherwin-Williams Company | 9,253 | 14.9% | -0.5% |
| 63 | Cadence Design Systems, Inc. | 4,007 | 26.4% | -5.7% | 140 | Willis Towers Watson Public Limited | 6,093 | 14.8% | 3.1% |
| 64 | International Business Machines | 2,081 | 26.3% | 8.2% | , , , | Company | 10.000 | 14.00/ | 4 10/ |
| e E | Corporation | 12.072 | 26.2% | 2.6% | 141 | American International Group, Inc. | 13,969 5,680 | 14.8% 14.6% | 4.1% 7.0% |
| 65 66 | O'Reilly Automotive, Inc. The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. | 13,073 30,510 | 26.2% | 1.8% | 142 143 | Fox Corporation Ross Stores, Inc. | 4,027 | 14.6% | 7.6% |
| | Ine Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Ingersoll Rand Inc. | 1,524 | 25.9% | | 143 | Gen Digital Inc. | 2,749 | 14.5% | -2.9% |
| 67 68 | Expedia Group, Inc. | 1,524 5,173 | 25.9% | 0.8% 16.5% | 144 | Nasdaq, Inc. | 2,749 | 14.4% | -2.9% -4.3% |
| 69 | Walmart Inc. | 29,605 | 25.9% | 5.8% | 145 | S&P Global Inc. | 20,230 | 14.1% | -1.1% |
| 70 | American Express Company | 21,853 | 25.4% | 3.8% | 146 | Lam Research Corporation | 13,404 | 14.1% | -8.7% |
| 70 | The Hartford Insurance Group, Inc. | 6,367 | 25.4% | 7.0% | 148 | Jacobs Solutions Inc. | 1,902 | 14.1% | 0.4% |
| 72 | The TJX Companies, Inc. | 9,659 | 24.9% | 7.1% | 149 | Juniper Networks, Inc. | 1,555 | 14.0% | 1.6% |
| 72 | Marathon Petroleum Corporation | 32,169 | 24.8% | 1.0% | 150 | Lowe's Companies, Inc. | 42,298 | 13.9% | -5.6% |
| 73 74 | NVR, Inc. | 6,549 | 24.8% | 4.3% | 151 | Prudential Financial, Inc. | 6,500 | 13.8% | 2.0% |
| 75 | Lennar Corporation | 6,230 | 24.0% | -0.7% | 152 | FedEx Corporation | 8,268 | 13.8% | -0.7% |
| 76 | T-Mobile US, Inc. | 48,402 | 23.8% | -0.3% | 153 | Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. | 9,187 | 13.8% | -13.4% |
| | | | | | 1 | | | | |

| Rank | Company Name | Total Buybacks (\$ millions) | Buyback ROI | Buyback Effectiveness | Rank | Company Name | Total Buybacks (\$ millions) | Buyback ROI | Buyback Effectivenes |
|------------|---|------------------------------------|----------------|--------------------------|------------|---|------------------------------------|----------------|-------------------------|
| 154 | Analog Devices, Inc. | 9,561 | 13.8% | -2.4% | 237 | Union Pacific Corporation | 19,488 | 5.7% | -3.0% |
| 155 | Regions Financial Corporation | 1,413 | 13.7% | 0.6% | 238 | Monster Beverage Corporation | 5,812 | 5.6% | -6.2% |
| 156 | HP Inc. | 15,262 | 13.6% | -3.2% | 239 | Cognizant Technology Solutions | 5,483 | 5.5% | -0.8% |
| 157 | Visa Inc. | 59,684 | 13.6% | 1.8% | | Corporation | . = 0.0 | E 40/ | 10.00 |
| 158 | Corpay, Inc. | 5,586 | 13.5% | 9.6% | 240 | ON Semiconductor Corporation | 1,798 | 5.4% | -16.8% |
| 159 | F5, Inc. | 2,151 | 13.4% | 2.0% | 241 | Hologic, Inc. | 3,284 | 5.3% | -3.8% -3.8% |
| 160 | Cincinnati Financial Corporation | 1,008 | 13.3% 13.2% | 4.1% 0.4% | 242 | CDW Corporation | 3,000 750 | 5.1% 4.7% | -0.6% |
| 161 162 | Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. MSCI Inc. | 2,505 3,764 | 13.2% | -6.3% | 243 244 | Jack Henry & Associates, Inc. CSX Corporation | 14,203 | 4.6% | -4.1% |
| 163 | Everest Group, Ltd. | 788 | 13.1% | 3.1% | 244 | PepsiCo, Inc. | 6,176 | 4.5% | -2.1% |
| 164 | Assurant, Inc. | 2,273 | 13.0% | 0.8% | 246 | Trimble Inc. | 1,048 | 4.5% | -6.1% |
| 165 | Phillips 66 | 9,421 | 13.0% | 5.7% | 247 | Keurig Dr Pepper Inc. | 2,487 | 4.5% | -1.2% |
| 166 | The Home Depot, Inc. | 30,896 | 12.8% | -2.1% | 248 | 3M Company | 5,863 | 4.3% | 1.4% |
| 167 | Texas Instruments Incorporated | 7,917 | 12.8% | -0.4% | 249 | J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc. | 1,378 | 4.3% | -5.4% |
| 168 | Omnicom Group Inc. | 2,302 | 12.8% | 3.8% | 250 | Teradyne, Inc. | 2,160 | 4.3% | -8.3% |
| 169 | M&T Bank Corporation | 3,164 | 12.8% | 4.7% | 251 | Mondelez International, Inc. | 9,398 | 4.3% | -2.3% |
| 170 | UnitedHealth Group Incorporated | 33,250 | 12.6% | -5.0% | 252 | Keysight Technologies, Inc. | 3,317 | 4.1% | -5.0% |
| 171 | Darden Restaurants, Inc. | 2,262 | 12.5% | 1.2% | 253 | Eastman Chemical Company | 2,550 | 4.0% | -5.1% |
| 172 | Gilead Sciences, Inc. | 5,675 | 12.4% | 1.1% | 254 | Norfolk Southern Corporation | 8,571 | 3.9% | -4.2% |
| 173 | Ecolab Inc. | 1,771 | 12.3% | 5.3% | 255 | AT&T Inc. | 6,990 | 3.8% | 2.2% |
| 174 | Otis Worldwide Corporation | 3,382 | 12.3% | NA | 256 | Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. | 13,601 | 3.8% | -8.1% |
| 175 | Sempra | 1,461 | 12.3% | 4.9% | 257 | U.S. Bancorp | 3,531 | 3.8% | 2.7% |
| 176 | Aon plc | 13,052 | 12.2% | -1.7% | 258 | ANSYS, Inc. | 1,100 | 3.7% 3.5% | -3.3% -6.0% |
| 177 | International Paper Company | 2,406 | 12.2% | 2.0% 2.6% | 259 | Chevron Corporation | 40,716 | 3.5% | -8.0% |
| 178 179 | Northrop Grumman Corporation Exxon Mobil Corporation | 9,973 53,092 | 12.1% 11.9% | -4.0% | 260 261 | Agilent Technologies, Inc. Elevance Health, Inc. | 4,407 13,023 | 3.5% | -6.0% |
| 180 | Molina Healthcare, Inc. | 2,366 | 11.9% | -6.5% | 262 | KeyCorp | 1,490 | 3.4% | -0.5% |
| 181 | Principal Financial Group, Inc. | 4,722 | 11.8% | -1.4% | 263 | Adobe Inc. | 30,634 | 3.4% | -6.8% |
| 182 | The Cigna Group | 28,709 | 11.4% | -1.5% | 264 | Domino's Pizza, Inc. | 2,559 | 3.3% | -6.8% |
| 183 | Accenture plc | 19,759 | 11.3% | -3.0% | 265 | Labcorp Holdings Inc. | 3,936 | 3.1% | -6.6% |
| 184 | Amgen Inc. | 15,021 | 11.3% | 1.7% | 266 | Kimberly-Clark Corporation | 2,425 | 3.0% | -0.6% |
| 185 | FactSet Research Systems Inc. | 859 | 11.3% | -2.5% | 267 | Invesco Ltd. | 620 | 2.6% | -2.8% |
| 186 | The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. | 7,772 | 11.2% | 1.5% | 268 | Fidelity National Information Services, | 8,437 | 2.5% | 9.8% |
| 187 | Illinois Tool Works Inc. | 6,456 | 11.1% | -0.8% | | Inc. | | | |
| 188 | QUALCOMM Incorporated | 19,927 | 10.9% | -5.2% | 269 | Amcor plc | 2,259 | 2.5% | -2.8% |
| 189 | ConocoPhillips | 24,655 | 10.9% | -5.1% | 270 | Sysco Corporation | 2,746 | 2.4% | 0.8% |
| 190 | Wynn Resorts, Limited | 827 | 10.4% | 15.5% | 271 | Zoetis Inc. | 5,621 | 2.3% | -5.6% |
| 191 | DuPont de Nemours, Inc. | 9,395 | 10.4% | 3.5% | 272 | Abbott Laboratories | 9,019 | 2.3% | -5.8% |
| 192 | Fifth Third Bancorp | 2,318 | 10.1% | -2.9% | 273 | The Charles Schwab Corporation | 6,237 | 2.0% | -9.5% |
| 193 | Northern Trust Corporation | 1,888 | 9.7% | 6.3% | 274 | Mettler-Toledo International Inc. | 4,633 | 1.9% | -9.5% |
| 194 | eBay Inc. | 20,497 | 9.5% | -3.8% | 275 | Constellation Brands, Inc. | 4,062 | 1.8% | -4.2% |
| 195 | McDonald's Corporation | 11,526 | 9.5% 9.5% | -1.4% -2.9% | 276 | Uber Technologies, Inc. | 1,269 | 1.8% | -14.6% |
| 196 | Autodesk, Inc. | 5,332 28,764 | 9.5% | 1.8% | 277 278 | Comcast Corporation | 38,928 1,298 | 1.8% 1.7% | 0.7% |
| 197 198 | Cisco Systems, Inc. Colgate-Palmolive Company | 6,971 | 9.4% | -0.1% | 278 | Pool Corporation Johnson & Johnson | 16,985 | 1.6% | -10.2% -3.8% |
| 199 | Capital One Financial Corporation | 12,247 | 9.3% | -4.6% | 280 | LyondellBasell Industries N.V. | 1,293 | 1.5% | -2.8% |
| 200 | Corteva, Inc. | 3,790 | 9.2% | -8.2% | 281 | Coterra Energy Inc. | 2,260 | 1.4% | -10.1% |
| 201 | Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. | 18,302 | 9.1% | -9.1% | 282 | The Hershey Company | 1,937 | 0.9% | -4.9% |
| 202 | The Procter & Gamble Company | 38,721 | 9.1% | -0.4% | 283 | The Campbell's Company | 597 | 0.9% | -1.3% |
| 203 | Deere & Company | 18,485 | 8.7% | -10.3% | 284 | Best Buy Co., Inc. | 5,668 | 0.5% | -6.5% |
| 204 | Bank of America Corporation | 54,904 | 8.7% | -0.3% | 285 | IQVIA Holdings Inc. | 4,363 | 0.4% | -6.7% |
| 205 | NXP Semiconductors N.V. | 8,494 | 8.6% | -6.6% | 286 | General Mills, Inc. | 5,188 | 0.3% | -7.4% |
| 206 | TE Connectivity plc | 5,937 | 8.4% | -3.1% | 287 | Bunge Global SA | 2,114 | 0.2% | -11.2% |
| 207 | Nucor Corporation | 10,108 | 8.3% | -12.6% | 288 | Genuine Parts Company | 1,064 | 0.2% | -6.3% |
| 208 | PPL Corporation | 1,004 | 8.3% | 4.0% | 289 | Molson Coors Beverage Company | 901 | -0.1% | -4.0% |
| 209 | Textron Inc. | 3,227 | 8.2% | -4.0% | 290 | West Pharmaceutical Services, Inc. | 1,513 | -0.2% | -14.7% |
| 210 | EOG Resources, Inc. | 4,459 | 8.2% | -7.7% | 291 | Starbucks Corporation | 7,374 | -0.2% | -4.7% |
| 211 | CF Industries Holdings, Inc. | 4,167 | 8.1% | -6.7% | 292 | Lamb Weston Holdings, Inc. | 575 | -0.4% | -0.2% |
| 212 | Electronic Arts Inc. | 6,991 | 7.7% 7.6% | -1.7% | 293 | Akamai Technologies, Inc. The Interpublic Group of Companies, | 3,046 1,062 | -0.4% -0.5% | -2.7% |
| 213 214 | Workday, Inc. Fortive Corporation | 1,858 1,605 | 7.6% | -1.2% 2.1% | 294 | Inc. | 1,002 | 0.5% | -10.1% |
| 215 | Quest Diagnostics Incorporated | 4,475 | 7.6% | -2.7% | 295 | Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. | 546 | -0.6% | -1.0% |
| 216 | The Coca-Cola Company | 5,732 | 7.6% | 0.3% | 296 | The Clorox Company | 1,248 | -1.0% | -5.6% |
| 217 | Merck & Co., Inc. | 4,773 | 7.4% | -0.4% | 297 | Weyerhaeuser Company | 940 | -1.2% | -6.2% |
| 218 | Viatris Inc. | 634 | 7.1% | 13.0% | 298 | Ulta Beauty, Inc. | 4,608 | -1.3% | -10.0% |
| 219 | Church & Dwight Co., Inc. | 1,100 | 7.1% | -2.2% | 299 | Newmont Corporation | 2,315 | -1.5% | -7.4% |
| 220 | Avery Dennison Corporation | 1,152 | 7.0% | -4.3% | 300 | T. Rowe Price Group, Inc. | 3,955 | -1.5% | -4.9% |
| 221 | A. O. Smith Corporation | 1,455 | 7.0% | -3.9% | 301 | The Walt Disney Company | 3,786 | -1.6% | 3.9% |
| 222 | Honeywell International Inc. | 16,664 | 6.9% | -0.3% | 302 | Becton, Dickinson and Company | 2,500 | -1.9% | -1.8% |
| 223 | Freeport-McMoRan Inc. | 2,080 | 6.9% | -20.2% | 303 | Bristol-Myers Squibb Company | 20,989 | -1.9% | -4.9% |
| 224 | Generac Holdings Inc. | 1,026 | 6.8% | -5.6% | 304 | Medtronic plc | 9,058 | -2.0% | 0.0% |
| 225 | L3Harris Technologies, Inc. | 8,175 | 6.8% | 1.0% | 305 | Henry Schein, Inc. | 1,692 | -2.0% | -3.6% |
| 226 | Allegion plc | 963 | 6.6% | 1.0% | 306 | Truist Financial Corporation | 2,866 | -2.1% | -2.7% |
| 227 | Expeditors International of Washington | 1, 4,757 | 6.4% | -4.2% | 307 | MGM Resorts International | 8,532 | -2.2% | -6.6% |
| | Inc. | | _ | | 308 | The J. M. Smucker Company | 1,698 | -2.3% | -6.9% |
| 228 | Waters Corporation | 1,555 | 6.4% | -3.8% | 309 | IDEXX Laboratories, Inc. | 2,726 | -2.6% | -12.0% |
| 229 | C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. | 2,414 | 6.2% | -2.4% | 310 | VeriSign, Inc. | 4,683 | -2.8% | -2.8% |
| 230 | Yum! Brands, Inc. | 3,625 | 6.2% | -1.2% | 311 | Conagra Brands, Inc. | 629 | -3.0% | -6.1% |
| 231 | Rockwell Automation, Inc. | 1,765 | 6.2% | -4.1% | 312 | Dow Inc. | 4,723 | -3.1% | -6.1% |
| 232 | Valero Energy Corporation | 12,771 | 6.1% | -5.2% | 313 | Ford Motor Company | 1,245 | -3.2% | -10.5% |
| 233 234 | Nordson Corporation | 556 1,117 | 6.1% 5.9% | -4.0% -4.3% | 314 315 | Dominion Energy, Inc. Iululemon athletica inc. | 3,080 3,701 | -3.2% -3.4% | -0.4% -11.3% |
| 234 | Zebra Technologies Corporation Citigroup Inc. | 19,549 | 5.9% | -4.3% 3.7% | 316 | Bio-Techne Corporation | 529 | -3.4% -3.7% | -11.3% -10.4% |
| 236 | Globe Life Inc. | 2,953 | 5.7% | 3.7% | 317 | Microchip Technology Incorporated | 2,799 | -3.7% | -10.4% |
| 200 | = = ==! | 2,000 | , , | 5.270 | 1 | | _,. 55 | 0,0 | 11.076 |

| Rank | Company Name | Total Buybacks (\$ millions) | Buyback ROI | Buyback Effectiveness |
|------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|--------------------------|
| 318 | PayPal Holdings, Inc. | 22,757 | -4.0% | 0.2% |
| 319 | Mohawk Industries, Inc. | 1,559 | -4.3% | -4.8% |
| 320 | Revvity, Inc. | 919 | -5.1% | -10.3% |
| 321 | Franklin Resources, Inc. | 1,022 | -5.1% | -4.7% |
| 322 | Tyson Foods, Inc. | 1,262 | -5.2% | -1.0% |
| 323 | The Kraft Heinz Company | 1,723 | -5.5% | -11.1% |
| 324 | LKQ Corporation | 2,130 | -6.4% | -9.8% |
| 325 | SBA Communications Corporation | 2,393 | -6.5% | -6.5% |
| 326 | Edwards Lifesciences Corporation | 4,904 | -7.0% | -4.9% |
| 327 | Skyworks Solutions, Inc. | 2,169 | -7.3% | -7.7% |
| 328 | MarketAxess Holdings Inc. | 384 | -7.4% | -1.9% |
| 329 | Devon Energy Corporation | 3,677 | -7.5% | -21.2% |
| 330 | CarMax, Inc. | 1,673 | -7.9% | -4.6% |
| 331 | Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. | 1,687 | -8.2% | -4.3% |
| 332 | Global Payments Inc. | 8,349 | -8.4% | -0.4% |
| 333 | Target Corporation | 12.270 | -8.8% | -14.4% |
| 334 | Paycom Software, Inc. | 725 | -8.9% | -6.3% |
| 335 | Ball Corporation | 2.560 | -9.1% | -8.2% |
| 336 | Occidental Petroleum Corporation | 4,929 | -9.2% | -14.8% |
| 337 | Halliburton Company | 2.155 | -9.3% | -16.4% |
| 338 | United Parcel Service, Inc. | 6,981 | -9.4% | -14.3% |
| 339 | EPAM Systems, Inc. | 716 | -10.7% | -12.9% |
| 340 | Danaher Corporation | 5,979 | -10.8% | -22.2% |
| 341 | Centene Corporation | 8,767 | -11.0% | -13.4% |
| 342 | Biogen Inc. | 9,229 | -12.0% | -2.8% |
| 343 | Schlumberger Limited | 2,833 | -12.2% | -16.9% |
| 344 | Charter Communications, Inc. | 41,353 | -12.6% | -8.3% |
| 345 | APA Corporation | 2,845 | -12.9% | -15.1% |
| 346 | Caesars Entertainment, Inc. | 322 | -13.6% | -9.6% |
| 347 | Stanley Black & Decker, Inc. | 2,413 | -15.7% | -9.1% |
| 348 | NIKE, Inc. | 17,778 | -15.9% | -13.7% |
| 349 | Align Technology, Inc. | 2,019 | -16.3% | -14.4% |
| 350 | Archer-Daniels-Midland Company | 6,583 | -16.5% | -22.5% |
| 351 | Intel Corporation | 18,398 | -16.9% | -2.9% |
| 352 | Pfizer Inc. | 2,000 | -17.4% | -16.4% |
| 353 | DexCom, Inc. | 1,996 | -18.1% | -25.1% |
| 354 | Baxter International Inc. | 1,132 | -18.8% | -4.7% |
| 355 | Humana Inc. | 6,385 | -19.8% | -17.7% |
| 356 | CVS Health Corporation | 9,514 | -20.6% | -19.4% |
| 357 | Dollar Tree, Inc. | 3,065 | -21.4% | -14.4% |
| 358 | The Mosaic Company | 3,068 | -22.1% | -27.5% |
| 359 | Paramount Global | 386 | -22.7% | -3.0% |
| 360 | Dollar General Corporation | 7,764 | -25.7% | -15.5% |
| 361 | Enphase Energy, Inc. | 1,626 | -26.4% | -42.7% |
| 362 | Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. | 1,687 | -29.7% | -3.8% |
| 363 | The Estée Lauder Companies Inc. | 3,463 | -34.5% | -22.5% |